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STARE DECISIS SED
CONCRETA
INTELLIGEREPRECEDENT AND
LONERGAN'S COMMON
SENSE*
"Stare decisis serves to take the capricious element out of law and to
give stability to a society."' These words of Justice Douglas underscore
what many authors believe to be the primary value of the doctrine of
precedent, that is, its contribution to certainty in the common law.2 Precedent has been defined as "[a]n adjudged case or decision of a court,
considered as furnishing an example or authority for an identical or similar case afterwards arising or a similar question of law."8 Courts generally
isolate the rule of a prior case as the "example or authority," and apply
that rule to analogous fact situations, relying on the reasoning which gave
expression to the rule." The doctrine of precedent thus is regarded as providing guidance in the common law.5
Two problems, however, are often noted in connection with stare de* This Article is a student work prepared by William R. Moriarty, a member of the St.

Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949). Although Justice Douglas believed that constitutional issues were always open to reexamination, id. at 736-37, he did not
mean to suggest that "[t]he law is . . .properly susceptible to whim or caprice," id. at 735.
2 See Llewellyn, Impressions of the Conference on Precedent, in JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 116 (1962); Von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 HARV. L. REv. 409, 409 (1924).
3 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1059 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
See People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 488, 348 N.E.2d 894, 901, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 425
(1976). Professor Llewellyn observes that no court ignores the foundation for the doctrine of
precedent, "which is to always keep in mind the reason for the rule... and alter the rule
when the reason is discovered to have ceased or been mistaken.
Llewellyn, supra note
2, at 117.
See Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 126-27; Von Moschzisker, supra note 2, at 413-14.
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cisis. First, commentators have called attention to the fact that the precise formulation of the doctrine often has proven elusive.' Indeed, Karl

Llewellyn identified sixty-four techniques that the courts have employed
in applying the doctrine." Then, too, Roscoe Pound has spoken of the
"art" of applying precedent and has urged judges to exercise a "Bergso-

nian intuition" in deciding cases." Gidon Gottlieb has narrowed the field
to three procedures which isolate precisely what is precedential in a prior
case.9 And Richard Wasserstrom has proposed a strict formulation of the
doctrine which highlights the principle's inadequacy as the sole rule for
decisional justification.10
A second problem noted by jurisprudents is that courts, while asserting the "binding" force of precedent, do not always follow prior rules."
Some techniques for overlooking prior decisions are: (1) to deny that the
prior case controls the present one; (2) to distinguish the prior case from
the present one; (3) to overrule the prior case as "wrong." 12 This leads to
I See

R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION 39 (1961). Professor Wasserstrom contends
that "almost all prior discussions" have failed to state clearly the doctrine of precedent. Id.
Commenting on the University of Cincinnati's Conference on Judicial Precedent, Professor
Llewellyn noted that the members of the Conference were unable to agree on a definition of
judicial precedent. Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 116.
K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 77-91 (1960).
See Pound, The Theory of JudicialDecision, 36 HARv. L. REv. 940, 951-52 (1923). Pound
theorizes that judges grasp individual situations by an intuition analogous to Bergson's lan
vital, and then advance to "generalize the claims of the parties as individual human claims
...and endeavor to frame a precept or state a principle that will secure the most of these
social interests that we may with the least sacrifice." Id. at 955.
' See G. GorrLIEB, THE LOGIC OF CHOICE 82-87 (1968). Gottlieb asserts that courts rely on
one or all of the following elements in applying precedent: (1) the inferring in the precedent
case; (2) the enunciated rule of the precedent case; and (3) the rule or principle preexisting
the precedent case. Id. He notes that, in practice, judges who rely on dicta discredit themselves. Id.
10 See R. WASSERSTROM, supra note 6, at 54-55. Professor Wasserstrom proposes the following formulation of the doctrine of precedent: "The rule of stare decisis requires that cases
which are similar to earlier cases be decided in the same way in which those earlier cases
were adjudicated." Id. Wasserstrom claims that a legal system which relies on this formulation for its sole rule of decision is inadequate as a system of decision justification. Id. at 8183.
" See Douglas, supra note 1, at 737 (in the constitutional arena, "stare decisis must give
way before the dynamic component of history"); see also The Status of the Rule of Judicial
Precedent, 14 U. CIN. L. REv. 203, 246 (1940) (remarks of Hutcheson, J.) ("[tihe idea of
complete fixity has never been associated with [the doctrine of precedent]").
" See, e.g., People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 488, 348 N.E.2d 894, 901, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419,
425 (1976) ("[d]istinctions in the application and withholding of stare decisis require a nice
delicacy and judicial self-restraint"); Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case and the Doctrine of Binding Precedent, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 164 (A. Guest ed. 1961)
(broadly stated rules may later be declared wrong); see also Salmond, The Theory of Judicial Precedents, 16 LAW Q. REv. 376, 381 (1900) (decisions contrary to reason are "wrong").
See generally R. WASSERSTROM, supra note 6, at 39-55.
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the question, what, in a particular case, is binding upon future cases?
Insofar as this paper seeks to contribute to an understanding of the
doctrine of precedent in the common-law system, it seeks to provide an
answer to the two problems posed above; It proposes to reach that understanding through an investigation of the common sense of the commonlaw judge. The investigation is guided in large part by the analysis of
common sense contained in Insight, Father Bernard Lonergan's study of
human understanding.
In the introduction to Insight, Lonergan sets out the book's program.
"Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you
understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood but also you
will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further
developments of understanding. 1 3 The act of understanding is termed an
insight, 4 and its occurrence is recognized in the experience of "getting
the point," or "catching on."' 5 Lonergan explores this act of understanding as it takes place in mathematicians, scientists and men of common
16
sense.
Contrasting scientific and commonsense understanding, 7 Lonergan
proffers that science moves from description of data to a complete explanation of the relations of things to each other.'" To achieve this understanding, science develops a technical vocabulary and a special method to
aid in proceeding from the familiar to the yet-to-be understood. 9 Finally,
science embodies its understanding in abstract laws of universal validity.20 Common sense, on the other hand, is content with descriptions
which relate things to the commonsense knower." ' Common sense has no
need of a technical vocabulary or a specialized method, because it remains within the realm of the familiar.2 2 And common sense's understanding of things finds expression in "proverbs," which, far from demanding universal validity in every case, tolerate exceptions without
B. LONERGAN, INSIGHT xxviii

(3d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as

INSIGHT].

IId. at ix.

Id. at 173. Lonergan presents a dramatic instance of the act of insight in the image of
Archimedes, who, preoccupied with the problem of Hiero's gold crown, suddenly "caught
on" when he lowered himself into the bath and realized that he could tell a pure gold crown
from a fake if he weighed the crown in water. Ecstatic about his find, Archimedes ran naked
from the bath shouting "Eureka!" or "I've got it!" Id. at 3.
Id. at ix, xxviii-xxix.
'7 Id. at 175-79, 293-99. The first five chapters of Insight concentrate on insights in mathematicians and scientists. See id. at 3-172. Chapters six and seven turn to the matter of
common sense. See id. at 173-244.
" Id. at 178.
" Id. at 176-77, 179.
'"

"0 Id. at 175-76.

" Id. at 178.
2

Id. at 179.
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embarrassment." Lonergan concludes that, although scientific understanding and commonsense understanding contemplate distinct objects,
they are
complementary modes of understanding within the same
24
subject.

In his later works, Lonergan identifies stages of meaning, each stage
representing a shift in the knower's horizon.25 At the first level is common
sense, a level at which the knower explores neither himself nor the relationships of things to each other, but confines his concern to the immediate and the practical.26 At a second level, the level of theory, scientists
seek the complete explanation of things attained only through an understanding of their interrelationships.2 7 On the third level, the level of interiority, the knower grasps the interrelationships of the elements of his
own cognitional structure and takes control of their operation. 6 In order
to appreciate fully the working of common sense, Lonergan would say,

one must shift one's horizon into the third stage of meaning.2 9
Lonergan's analysis of common sense covers three principal topics.
He examines: (1) common sense and its subject;30 (2) common sense as
object;3

'

and (3) commonsense judgments.2 On the side of the subject, or

knower, an advance in common sense broadens the individual's horizon,
providing a ground for further questions and, hence, further insights.33
On the side of the object, the advance of practical common sense effects a
development in the social and political structures.3 4 Finally, it is through
a series of correct commonsense judgments that this twofold development
Is Id. at 176.
14 Id. at 179.
'5 See B. LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY 85-99 (1972) [hereinafter cited as METHOD].

One's horizon corresponds to the scope of one's knowledge and interests. Id. at 236. Not
only may horizons overlap, as in the cage of a lawyer who is also a family man, id., but by a
succession of "conversions," one's horizon can shift. This shift is marked by an appropriation of one's own feelings, intelligence, moral structure and religious values. See id. at 237-

44.
" See id. at 85.
See id.
Is See id.
Is See id. at 97-99. "Common sense knows, but it does not know what it knows nor how it
knows nor how to correct and complement its own inadequacies." INSIGHT, supra note 13, at
216. It stands in need of a "higher viewpoint" and a method which can appropriate it and
explain it fully. See id. at 394.
INSIGHT, supra note 13, at 173-206.
" Id. at 207-44.
32 Id. at 289-99.
$3 See METHOD, supra note 25, at 81-83. One's horizon broadens as one engages spontaneously in a "self-correcting process of learning." Id. at 81; see INSIGHT, supra note 13, at 17475.
INSIGHT, supra note 13, at 214; see infra notes 79-94 and accompanying text.
'7
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While Lonergan himself has not made explicit the implications of his
account of common sense for the field of legal philosophy, it is submitted
that his analysis of common sense points toward the resolution of the two
jurisprudential problems raised earlier. It would appear that the elements
of such a solution track the broad outline of Lonergan's account. That is,
the suggested solution rests upon an understanding that (1) the commonlaw judge is a commonsense subject; (2) his dispute resolution role is an
object of common sense's practical orientation; and (3) the judge's activity in rendering common-law decisions is a function of his activity of
making commonsense judgments.
COMMON SENSE

Common Sense and its Subject
Lonergan begins his study of common sense with the observation
that every human being is an asker of questions. 3 6 As the questions arise
spontaneously, prompted by a pure, unrestricted desire to know, so too,
their answers arise spontaneously." But if these answers, called insights,
are incomplete, they give rise to further questions.3 8 3This cycle of "question-answer" is a self-correcting process of learning. '
Lonergan observes that working out the answers for oneself is a laborious task.'0 Teaching, however, eases the burden by offering hints which
lead to insights and by cajoling attention away from blind alleys.' 1 This
task of teaching, Lonergan notes, may be executed formally by professionals, or informally as one listens to and observes the daily conversasupra note 13, at 290-91. The community of mankind profits from the self-correcting process which takes place in individuals. Id. at 290. The shared intellectual curiosity
of a community leads to further insights and to the development of the society. Id. But men
can reject intellect and opt for passion and prejudice. In the measure that they do so they
contribute to society's decline. Id. at 290-91.
Id. at 173-74. Lonergan points to the natural curiosity of children to demonstrate man's
informal questioning. Id. He notes that one either admits to being anxious for understanding or one must confess to being a somnambulist. See METHOD, supra note 25, at 17. As
Professor McShane writes, "There is no denying the native wonder of man." P. MCSHANE,
3" INSIGHT,

WEALTH OF SELF AND WEALTH OF NATIONS 17 (1975).

31 INSIGHT, supra note 13, at 174.
0

Id.

to think
39 Id. Lonergan writes that once any insight has been attained, "one has only ..
on the basis of that insight, for its incompleteness to come to light and thereby generate a
further question." Id. As questions call forth insights which call forth further questions in a
spontaneous cycle, there can be identified a self-correcting process of learning. Id.
"0Id. at 289. Lonergan observes that while garnering insights on one's own can be a difficult
task, it is the most fruitful way of discovering answers to questions. Id. at 174.
" Id. at 174-75.
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tions and performances of those around him. 43 Through communication,
ideas are disseminated throughout a community which scrutinizes them
in the light of its experience, accepting the workable and rejecting the
impracticable. 3 Thus, by a process of collaboration there is compiled a
common fund of tested answers from which each member of the community may draw his share according to his ability."
Lonergan writes that common sense "is a specialization of intelligence in the particular and the concrete.' 4 5 Its common fund of answers
is an incomplete set of insights which requires further insights into concrete situations for its completion in any given set of circumstances. 6
This is so, he notes, because unlike the sciences, common sense has no
propensity for universal laws which are valid in every instance, but is concerned, rather, with describing events as they relate to the commonsense
subject. 47 When common sense appears to generalize,'48 states Lonergan, it
gives utterance to statements akin to proverbs which are not meant to be
the premises for logical deductions, but which are attempts to express an
incomplete set of insights. 49 Examples of such proverbs are "Look before
you leap," and "A wink is as good as a nod."
It is proposed that rules of law resemble commonsense generalizations more closely than they resemble the universal laws of science. This
proposition may be illustrated by an example from the law of torts. The
general rule is that one who negligently injures another is liable to the
injured party in damages. This rule of law is not an abstract law valid in
every instance. It is an incomplete appreciation of the relationship be-

42 Id.

41 Id. at 175.
"4 Id. Men belong to a community which possesses a common fund of tested answers. As
new ideas arise to challenge the old answers, that common fund suffers modification.
Through the efforts of a sustained communication, the self-correcting process of learning is
at work, not only in the individual, but in the community as well. Id.; see supra note 39.
48 INSIGHT, supra note 13, at 175.
46 Id. Common sense, writes Lonergan, "is common without being general.
Id. This is
so because it consists of a set of incomplete insights. Id.
47 Id. at 178. This conclusion rests on a strange insight, called an inverse insight, in which
the point to be grasped is that one's question is beside the point. See id. at 19-25. Since
common sense resembles science in that it is an activity of the intellect, one may ask, "What
are the postulates, definitions, and inferences of common sense?" This question is beside
the point, for common sense has no postulates, definitions, or inferences. These elements
pertain to the abstract, and common sense is concerned only with the concrete. Id. at 175.
4'Lonergan offers the following analysis of analogies and generalizations. Analogies proceed from the assumption that some concrete situation, A, is correctly understood, to. argue
that some other similar situation, B,is to be understood in the same way. Generalizations
argue that every other similar situation, X, is to be understood in the same way as A. Id. at
287-88. Concrete situations, however, do not as a rule yield insights of general application.
Generalizing from such situations, therefore, is often met with suspicion. Id. at 288-89.
49 Id. at 176.
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tween parties in a personal injury suit. Complete appreciation, however, is
not the expression of a rule, but results when a particular instance of
negligence commands the attention of a commonsense knower.8 0 When A,
driving on the wrong side of the road, injures B, the commonsense knower
adds to the rule of law the insights to be gleaned from these concrete
facts in order to find A liable to B. Until then, the rule expresses an incomplete understanding which, like a proverb, is merely well to bear in.
mind.
A chief characteristic of common sense, Lonergan notes, is its restriction of its horizon to questions about the concrete and particular, the
practical and immediate. 1 "To advance in common sense is to restrain
the omnivorous drive of inquiring intelligence and to brush aside as irrelevant, if not silly, any question whose answer would not make an immediately palpable difference." 2 Consonant with this movement of common
sense, it is suggested, the decisions of judges display a reluctance to confront questions not necessary for the resolution of the dispute before the
3
court.1
Finally, as Lonergan observes, common sense varies with time and
place, occupation and circumstance." ' It appears, therefore, that a judicial
common sense can be identified, the horizon of which is a common fund
of insights called the common law." The common-law judge grasps the
"insights into" the concrete situation presented by the material facts,
adds these insights to his already accumulated store, and renders a decision. He deliberately excludes from consideration further questions of no
immediate practicality. He is not reluctant to admit obvious exceptions in
the law because the administration of justice is not a matter of deduction
from universal principles, but of insight into concrete situations of fact.
In sum, it is submitted, the mode of understanding of the common-law
judge is the mode of understanding of the commonsense subject."
"0Id. at 175-77.
" Id. at 179.

11 Id. at 178.
See Simpson, supra note 12, at 160.
INSIGHT, supra note 13, at 180. Lonergan notes that "[fror every difference of geography
. . .of occupation . . . of social arrangements, there is an appropriate variation of common
sense." Id. In the limit, the cumulative differences in common sense make for different nations, civilizations, and eras of human history. Id.
6 The notion that the common law consists of a common set of insights finds different
formulation elsewhere among commentators. E.g., Stone, From Principles to Principles, 97
LAW Q. REV.224, 229-33 (1981) (discussion of Professor Atiyah's "received ideals" which are
incarnated in the community).
Throughout this discussion, attention has been directed to the free operation of common
sense. But Lonergan observes that men are motivated by a variety of drives. They can stifle
the pure desire to know. They can flee from insight, refuse to ask further questions, prevent
the possibility of their occurrence. To the extent that an entire community flees from under-
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Common Sense as Object
Lonergan remarks that common sense is practical.5 7 In its practical
orientation, he states, common sense is concerned with the satisfaction of
a series of recurrent human desires. 8 By a spontaneous intersubjectivity
these desires are felt to be common, and so, primitive community coheres.5 9 But civil community moves away from "its obscure origins in
human intersubjectivity,"6 0 and toward a grander enterprise, as common
sense attempts to provide abundant satisfaction for a range of common
desires. To deal with the recurrent problem of human desires, practical
common sense generates a technology which satisfies those desires efficiently. To deal with the recurrent problem of the balance between capital formation and a distribution scheme, common sense generates an economics. Finally, to deal with the recurrent problem of effective human
agreement, practical common sense generates a polity.6 1
Practical common sense, Lonergan observes, is different to some extent in each individual, and to the degree that the satisfaction of individual desires conflicts, there arises the problem of effective human agreement. 62 Those men who can best persuade others to a common course of
action present an immediate solution to this problem. With their rise, he
notes, rises the political structure.13 Within that structure, a machinery
for dispute resolution is required. Thus, there has developed a judicial
scheme whose purpose is to administer justice.
Still, justice is to be administered, not in accordance with the universal laws of science, nor in strict conformity with an analytical logic, but
by an exercise of the same practical common sense which gave rise to the
complex structures of civil community. Thus, within the political specialization of common sense, it is submitted, there is a judicial common sense,
the horizon of which, again, is a common fund of insights called the common law. To the extent that judges contribute to the advance of practical
intelligence as it penetrates civil community, it would appear, they are
responsible for a transformation which lifts man from the level of intersubjectivity to the level of a community in control of its development.,
standing, there arises all the prejudice and blindness of a civilization. See INSIGHT, supra
note 13, at 222-32. The further result of this flight is the disappearance of common sense
itself, as the common horizon shrinks. D. TRACY, THE ACHIEVEMENT OF BERNARD LONERGAN
116-18 (1970).
6 INSIGHT, supra note 13, at 179, 207-09.
Id. at 208.
9 Id. at 212.
0 Id. at 212-13.
61 Id. at 208-09.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 209.
" See id. at 213. Lonergan states that common sense brings about a shift from intersubjec-
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This transformation is marked by a new notion of the good. Not only
is there the satisfaction of individual desires, but there comes to be acknowledged what Lonergan calls the good of order.6" This good of order
is, in fact, "the concrete manner in which cooperation is working out.""
Lonergan identifies the state and the law as the institutional bases upon
which this "working out" is grounded. 7 While the good of order does not
neglect instances of the particular good, it regards them in the aggregate
and as recurrent. 8 For example, just dispute resolution between A and B
is an instance of a particular good. Just dispute resolution among all parties, however, is a part of the good of order.6a
Lonergan asserts that this order is not abstract, but concrete.7 0 In a
spontaneous fashion, it becomes an indispensable component of concrete
human living.7 1 Thus, for example, a common understanding can be expressed in a state's constitution. Technical and material changes, however, have their counterparts in economics and politics. To meet these
changes, the nature of the state can be changed explicitly by amending its
constitution. But the same change can be wrought, subtly, by reinterpretation of that constitution. 2 As Lonergan notes, any change in the commonsense subject's understanding has its parallel in the objects of common sense,7 3 among which is the political structure.
To summarize, practical common sense generates the institutions of
the state and the law in an effort to deal with the problem of human
agreement. Common sense works a change in the notion of the good to
bring about the notion of the good of order. The common-law scheme, it
appears, with its judges and juries, its doctrines and statutes, is a part of
tivity, with its identification of the good with particular goods, to a grander civil community,
where technology interposes itself between man and nature, and economics and the state
interpose themselves between man and man. Id. Since common-law judges are men of common sense, it would appear that they help bring about a continual shift in the object of
practical common sense identified as the political structure.
06 Id. Lonergan defines the good of order as "an intelligible pattern of relationships that
conditions the fulfilment of each man's desires by his contribution to the fulfilment of the
desires of others, and, similarly, protect each from the object of his fears in the measure he
contributes to warding off the objects feared by others." Id.
" METHOD, supra note 25, at 49.
07

Id.

Id. Lonergan notes that while the good of order is distinct from instances of particular
goods, it is not separate from them. It is no mere showcase for particular goods, however,
but serves as the concrete possibility of their emergence. Id.
11 Id. Lonergan offers several examples of the good of order. Among the possibilities are
dinner for all men, or education for all who desire it. Id.
70 INSIGHT, supra note 13, at 213.
7, Id. at 214.
72 B. LONERGAN, COLLECTION 254 (1967).
73 INSIGHT, supra note 13, at 207.

LONERGAN'S COMMON SENSE

that good of order. It is within this scheme that the doctrine of stare
decisis finds expression.
THE DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENT

The doctrine of stare decisis has its place in both the objective and
subjective components of common sense. On the side of the object, it is
an insight of practical common sense which recognizes the value of consistency in the law."' As such, it becomes an indispensable part of the good
of order identified as the common-law legal system. On the side of the
subject, the doctrine finds its roots in an immanent and operative principle of human knowing which Lonergan expresses as follows: similars are
to be similarly understood.75 Lonergan demonstrates that this principle
serves as the ground for the spontaneous tendency of common sense to
analogize and generalize in an informal manner.7 6 Hence, common sense
need not be taught to identify similarities or to make generalizations.7
The problem lies, Lonergan
writes, in teaching common sense to frame its
78
generalizations with care.

It is submitted that this natural tendency of common sense to analogize and generalize helps to explain why judges follow some cases and
distinguish others. Judges follow cases when they grasp the insight that a
prior situation is similar to the present situation and that the prior situation was understood correctly. They distinguish cases when they grasp
the material differences between the prior situation and the present situation and reach a solution which meets the present circumstance. But the
questions remain. How does common sense confirm its insights that situations are or are not similar? How does common sense sustain its understanding that a prior situation is or is not correctly met? It is proposed
that in order to understand the binding element in preceding cases, it is
necessary to answer these questions successfully. The suggested solution
rests upon the analysis of the correctness of commonsense judgments offered by Father Lonergan.
Commonsense Judgments
A judgment, as Lonergan observes, is merely an assent or a denial.7 9
According to Lonergan, any judgment involves a grasp of the virtually
unconditioned, that is, a conditioned that in fact has all its conditions
11See supra notes

1-5 and accompanying text.
75 INSIGHT, supra note 13, at 288.
76 Id.
77

Id.

78 Id.

79 Id. at 272.
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fulfilled. 0 He identifies three elements in the virtually unconditioned: (1)
a conditioned; (2) a link between the conditions and the conditioned; and
(3) the fulfillment of the conditions."1 The act by which these three elements are grasped and understood as a virtually unconditioned Lonergan
calls the act of reflective understanding. 2
The simplest example of a virtually unconditioned is the form of
inference.
If A, then B.
But A.
Therefore, B.
The conditioned is the conclusion, "Therefore, B." The link is provided
by the major premise, "If A, then B." The fulfillment of the conditions
occurs in the minor premise, "But A." 8
8
The same scheme can be illustrated by any concrete judgment. '
Suppose that X is driving on the wrong side of the road and collides with
Y, injuring Y. Is X liable to Y? The conditioned is the prospective judgment, "X is liable to Y." It is only a prospective judgment because all the
conditions have not yet been established as fulfilled. The link is the insight that relates the data of the hypothetical to the question of X's liability to Y. The fulfilling conditions are the data, that is, that X was driving on the wrong side of the road when he hit Y and injured him. By an
act of reflective understanding, one grasps these three elements as a virtually unconditioned, and the judgment, "X is liable to Y," follows.
It appears that Lonergan's analysis of judgment has marshalled the
elements for establishing as valid commonsense determinations of the
similarity of prior and present cases. Common sense validates these insights, Lonergan would say, by correct judgments. 5 It does so by grasping
Id. at 280. The development of judgment as a "virtually unconditioned" has been considered by many commentators as Lonergan's "most important and original technical innovation." D. TRACY, supra note 56, at 128. While the vocabulary of the "virtually unconditioned" is easily mastered, one runs the risk of slipping into nominalism unless one finds
oneself making judgments in the manner brought to light in Insight. See P. MCSHANE, THE
SHAPING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 9 (1976).
8' INSIGHT, supra note 13, at 280.
82 Id. at 279. Lonergan distinguishes between questions for intelligence and questions for
reflection. The former are met by definitions and formulations. The latter are met by a
"Yes" or a "No." Id. at 271-74. The act of reflective understanding is that act by which the
virtually unconditioned is grasped. Id.
83 Id. at 280-81. Lonergan has argued that the form of inference "reveals the nature of the
mind" irrespective of the content of the judgment. B. LONERGAN, supra note 72, at 2. The
form of inference is merely a clear example of the virtually unconditioned, however, not a
model for every type of judgment. INSIGHT, supra note 13, at 281.
84 INSIGHT, supra note 13, at 281-83.
80

"' See id. at 284.
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the virtually unconditioned in similar situations. The conditioned is a
prospective judgment, "Case A is similar to Case B." The fulfilling conditions are the data of Case A and the data of Case B. The link between the
two is a law immanent and operative in human knowing. It is the principle that similars are to be similarly understood, that human knowers cannot help understanding like situations as like."6 Again, through an act of
reflective understanding, the human knower reached the judgment: "Case
A is similar to Case B."
There remains to be asked: How does one know that one's judgments
are correct? The answer lies in the inquiring and rational nature of
human knowing.
Although Lonergan observes that man asks questions spontaneously
and insights arise spontaneously to answer the questions,"7 he distinguishes between vulnerable and invulnerable insights.8 8 Insights are vulnerable when there remain further questions to be asked on the issue."
Insights are invulnerable when there are no further questions to be
asked.9" When there are no further questions and all the evidence is in,
by an act of reflective understanding the rational human knower affirms
that his judgment on the matter is correct.91 As Lonergan writes, "if, in
fact, there are no further questions, then, in fact, the insight is invulnerable; if, in fact, the insight is invulnerable, then, in fact, the judgment approving it will be correct."92
Lonergan's solution to the problem of correct judgment is, as he
states, in terms of the virtually unconditioned.9 3 This can be illustrated as
follows. The conditioned is the prospective judgment: "It is correct that
X is liable to Y." The fulfilling condition is human rationality itself, the
very fact that human knowers affirm or deny by an act of reflective understanding. 94 The link between the two is a dual consideration: (1) the
insight rendering X liable to Y is correct if it is invulnerable; and (2) that
insight is invulnerable if there remain no further questions relative to X's
liability to Y. There follows the judgment: "It is correct that X is liable to
It would appear, therefore, that common-law judges correctly affirm
Id. at 287-89. David Tracy has observed that the link in judgments of an analogical nature is a law immanent and operative in human knowing, that is, that similars are to be
similarly understood. D. TRACY, supra note 56, at 131.
87 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
88 INSIGHT, supra note 13, at 284.
86

89 Id.

90 Id.
91

Id.

92 Id. at 284-85.
93

Id. at 287.
Id. at 284; see D. TRACY, supra note 56, at 129.
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that prior cases are similar to present cases if in fact there are no further
pertinent questions to be asked which would reveal any material dissimilarities between the prior and present situations. The same procedure
seemingly can be extended to those cases in which the judge distinguishes
the present case from the prior case, for if the cases are similar, he cannot
help understanding them to be similar. If the prior case was decided correctly, it would be unintelligent presently to decide otherwise. But if the
situations are dissimilar, this dissimilarity will reveal itself to the common-law judge in the occurrence of further questions which remain unanswered by the analysis of the prior case.
By the same token, if the prior decision was incorrectly decided or
misunderstood, further questions will arise and challenge the incomplete
answers of the past. The judge, if he is not to deny his intelligence nor
abdicate his responsibility, must answer the further questions which will
lead to a revision of the former position, and determine that the earlier
decision was incorrect. It is submitted that this is no arbitrary demand,
for the inquiry is not whether further questions occur to a particular
judge. 5 The inquiry is whether there are in fact any further questions to
be asked in order to understand correctly a given situation.
This analysis appears consonant with what judges themselves have
said about precedent. Stare decisis is not a rule whereby the most recent
9 6
case controls the future regardless of whether that case was correct.
Judges impose upon themselves a requirement that precedent be applied
fairly and intelligently."7 It is suggested that the authoritativeness of
prior decisions rests not upon priority in time, but rather upon a series of
judgments affirming the correctness of the prior decisions. With the adSee INSIGHT, supra note 13, at 284. The virtually unconditioned is not reached merely
because questions fail to occur to a particular subject. Further questions may fail to arise for
a variety of reasons, among them inattention, boredom and complacency. To pass judgment
in such a situation is unauthentic. Id. There is no formula for producing men of good judgment. Id. at 285.
9' In Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940), Justice Frankfurter wrote, "[S]tare decisis
is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision,
however recent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience." Id. at
119; see also People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 488, 348 N.E.2d 894, 901, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419,
425 (1976).
" Judges refuse to apply precedent unthinkingly, because they realize that "reason and the
power to advance justice must always be [the law's] chief essentials . . . ." Von Moschzisker, supra note 2, at 414. Adherence to reason in decisionmaking can be seen in the efforts
of jurisprudents to develop systems for justifying decisions. See, e.g., R. WASSERSTROM,
supra note 6, at 1-11. Britain's Lord Denning is a notable example of a judge who refuses to
apply precedent blindly. He is of the opinion that "mistaken" decisions are without the
purview of stare decisis. See Carty, Precedent and the Court of Appeal, 1 LEGAL STUD. 68,
71-73 (1981).
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vent of this series of judgments, further insights, slowly, collaboratively,
pass into the common fund of insights called the common law.
CONCLUSION

Any attempt at precise formulation of the doctrine of precedent, it is
suggested, will take account of its roots in common sense. On the side of
the object, it is an insight of practical intelligence which favors consistency and intelligent growth in the law. On the side of the subject, the
doctrine is grounded in common sense's natural propensity to analogize
and generalize. Further, the validity, in limited circumstances, of these
procedures, is established by a series of correct judgments made by common-law judges with reference to the similarity or dissimilarity of prior
and present cases.
Additionally, it is proposed that any account of the binding element
in precedent will advert to the role of correct judgment. By an act of
reflective understanding judges affirm that prior decisions are or are not
correct. While it may be argued that this undermines certainty in the
common law, it is submitted that, as practical common sense advances to
effect changes in technology, economics and politics, so too, does the common fund of tested answers change. The common law is not a body of
universal rules, valid in every instance. It is, instead, a common store of
insights that awaits insights into concrete situations for its completion.
Although Father Lonergan has not addressed directly any jurisprudential
problems in Insight, it is indeed evident that his analysis of common
sense has far-reaching implications for both the legal profession and the
common-law system of jurisprudence.

